Case Ditails

Scenario
Case Name Explosion due to inadequate storage of explosives in the temporary storage house
Pictograph
Date August 1, 2000
Place Taketoyo, Aichi, Japan
Location Explosive factory
Overview Large explosion occurred in a temporary storage of an explosives manufacturing factory on August 1st, 2000. Some smokeless gunpowder that had been kept for a long period was put on the west side of the storage exposed to the sunlight. Moreover, smokeless gunpowder had deteriorated because the control of temperature and humidity was improper, and they ignited spontaneously. The fire spread to other gunpowder in the storage, and smokeless gunpowder exposed to high temperature exploded. The storage blew without any trace and 13 craters were generated on the floor. A total of 320 factory buildings were damaged. The breakdown is 29 destroyed, 39 partially destroyed, 192 damaged, and 60 suffered glass damage. A total of 79 persons were injured outside the factory, and 888 nearby buildings were damaged. Breakdown is 12 collapsed, 26 partially collapsed, 440 damaged, glass damage to 364 buildings, and other damage to 46 houses. In addition, debris was scattered over farms in the area, with extensive damage to nearby inhabitants.
Incident A large explosion occurred in a temporary storage for explosives in an explosives manufacturing factory. Stored smokeless gunpowder ignited spontaneously and propagated to other gunpowder kept in the temporary explosives storage. There was a large explosion. The temporary explosives storage blew up with nothing remaining, and many factory buildings were seriously damaged. Many private houses around the factory were also damaged, and a lot of debris dispersed over surrounding farms, with major damage sustained by nearby inhabitants. The injured were all third parties.
Processing Storage
Substance Smokeless powder
Type of Accident Explosion
Sequence On August 1st, 2000, about 7.1 tons of smokeless gunpowder and about 0.6 tons of explosives, of which the principal ingredient was perchlorate, were being kept in a temporary storage. Most employees were not present because it was a holiday.
On July 31st, 15:00, 36 kg of smokeless gunpowder was carried out from the storage, and 31 kg of other smokeless gunpowder was carried into the storage. At this time, abnormal phenomena related to the smokeless gunpowder such as malodor were not recognized.
On August 1st, 22:09:10: The alarm of the storage operated. It was presumed that a door or a window of the storage opened.
22:09:23: The alarm was cancelled. It was presumed an event such as a cut of a transmission cable occurred.
22:09:29. Alarms operated in workrooms near the storage. It was presumed that something that affected windows and doors of these workrooms occurred.
After 22:09:30. Alarms of other workrooms in the vicinity operated. It was presumed that a large explosion occurred at this time.
The storage was completely destroyed. The deformed iron frame remained, the roof and the wall were scattered. Moreover, 13 craters had been generated in the floor. A total of 79 persons were injured, and they were not related to the factory. A total of 888 buildings suffered damage among nearby houses, etc. The breakdown was 12 destroyed, 26 partially destroyed, 440 damaged, 364 house with glass damage, and 46 cases of other damage.
Cause It is estimated that smokeless gunpowder, which had deteriorated, ignited spontaneously because it was left in a temporary storage for several years. Some gunpowder that had been kept for a long period was exposed to sunlight streaming in from the west side of the temporary storage. In addition, they deteriorated because the control of temperature and humidity was improper, and they ignited spontaneously. This fire spread to other gunpowder in the storage, and smokeless gunpowder exposed to high temperatures exploded.
Response 1. Compensation for damage to nearby private houses.
2. Employees harvested crops in nearby farms that might have been contaminated by dispersed explosive, and all crops were bought by the factory.
3. Establishment of a window for responding to surrounding residents.
Countermeasures 1. Improving safety consciousness not only of site employees but also executive staff. Enhanced safety education to give basic knowledge of contents of law, technical standards, and characteristics of explosives necessary for manufacturing explosives.
2. Establishing a system of instruction for explosives manufacturing safety manager at the site, enhanced a monitoring system, and strengthened a safety management system through double checks.
3. Stability tests for explosives appropriately were carried out.
4. Appropriate shading measures to protect explosives against sunlight was taken. The temperature and humidity recorder was installed, and measures to reduce the effects of temperature and humidity were taken.
5. It was made well-known among employees that the temporary storage was to be used to keep semi-finished explosive products temporarily or to keep explosives for a short period, and a deadline was provided.
6. Automatic fire extinguishing facilities were installed in temporary storages.
7. Size of the container of smokeless gunpowder was reduced, and the amount accommodated in one container was reduced.
Knowledge Comment 1. Differences in the stability of smokeless gunpowder occur because additives differ according to uses.
2. Smokeless gunpowder might cause an intense explosion if exposed to a high-temperature environment.
Background The manager of the factory executed the storage management based on thoughts that smokeless gunpowder may burn but does not cause an intense explosion.
Sequel Local inhabitants complained of mental trauma following the accident, which became a social problem.
Reason for Adding to DB Example of accident caused due to insufficient management from lower recognition of hazards of an executive manager for a long time
Scenario
Primary Scenario Poor Value Perception, Poor Safety Awareness, Inadequate Risk Recognition, Ignorance, Insufficient Knowledge, Convincement, Planning and Design, Poor Planning, Poor Storage Planning, Usage, Transport/Storage, Storage, Malicious Act, Rule Violation, Safety Rule Violation, Secondary Damage, External Damage, Explosion, Bodily Harm, Injury, 79 person injured, Loss to Organization, Economic Loss, 4700 million yen, Damage to Society, Social Systems Failure, 500 adjacent houses damaged
Sources Investigation committee for the accident at N oils and fats Co., Ltd. T factory. The research report on accident at No.12 explosives temporary storage in N oils and fats Co., Ltd. T factory. (2000).
Number of Injuries 79
Physical Damage Damage to the factory: Collapse of 29 factory buildings, partial collapse of 39 buildings, damage to 192 buildings, glass damage to 60 buildings.
Damage to residences around factory: 12 houses and buildings collapsed, 26 buildings partially collapsed, damage to 440 buildings, and glass damage to 364 buildings.
Financial Cost Extraordinary loss: ¥ 3,721 million (compensation: about ¥3 billion, facilities restoration expensed: about ¥ 7 hundred million). Sales lost by the shutdown: ¥ 1 billion.
Multimedia Files Fig2.Photograph of the accident site
Field Chemicals and Plants
Author OGAWA, Terushige (Graduate School of Environment and Information Sciences, Yokohama National University)
TAMURA, Masamitsu (Center for Risk Management and Safety Sciences, Yokohama National University)
Scenario