| Case Name |
Explosion of LPG due to indoor discharge of a residue in a cylinder at a LPG filling station, and spread of fire caused due to the rupture of the cylinders |
| Pictograph |
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| Date |
August 19, 1988 |
| Place |
Asahikawa, Hokkaido, Japan |
| Location |
LPG filling station |
| Overview |
On August 19th, 1989. LPG liquid and gas that remained in cylinders were recovered at the LPG filling station to inspect cylinders. During the work, LPG was released onto the deck or inside the room. It was ignited by electric sparks etc., and exploded. Other cylinders in the filling area exploded and damage spread. The cause was having given priority to working efficiency over guaranteeing safety. Improving a worker's safety consciousness is important. |
| Incident |
At a LPG cylinder filling station, liquid and gas that remained in LPG cylinders were recovered to examine the cylinders. LPG that had accumulated in the recovery room ignited and exploded, and the building was damaged. Furthermore, the cylinders were heated by the fire, exploded, and the fire spread. The factory, a distribution company, etc. were destroyed by fire. |
| Processing |
Manufacture |
| Individual Process |
Other |
| Substance |
Liquefied petroleum gas |
| Type of Accident |
Explosion |
| Sequence |
On August 19th, 1988, 17:30. Filling work and inspection work were finished as usual.
18:20. Overtime work for inspecting a cylinder including gas recovery work started.
20:14. LPG that accumulated in the recovery room ignited, and a fire broke out.
20:15. The first explosion occurred.
20:17. An emergency call was made.
After 20:24. The cylinders were heated by the fire, a total of 162 cylinders exploded sequentially, and the fire spread.
20:34-42. A fireball was generated.
23:30 The fire was suppressed. In addition, explosions at 30-ton and 50-ton tanks were avoided by fire-fighting activities. |
| Cause |
As LPG gas was released directly inside the recovery room, a combustible gas-air mixture was generated. Many cylinders were carried in because it was the day after the "bon" holidays. The cylinders containing small amounts of residual gas were left in the room and the residual LPG gas was released to the deck or inside the room without using gas recovery facilities. Many cylinders were piled up and blocked the ventilation openings.
The ignition source was not specified, although sources of ignition were presumed to be sparks from electric equipment, friction, and impact sparks or static electricity.
Although it was presumed that the gas leak alarm in the next office sounded, the office was empty after 19:30. |
| Response |
An emergency cut-off valve was operated. A tank block valve was closed. A report was made to the fire department. Water was not sprayed onto the cylinder which was burning. The sprinkler system of the tank was used to prevent the spread of fire. Cooking with spraying water. |
| Countermeasures |
Observance of a work standard. Planned management of an operation process. Giving thorough safety education, and raising safety consciousness. Rationalization of the number of cylinders. Restudy of installation points of the gas leak alarm. Prevention of inflow of gas to the neighboring work room. |
| Knowledge Comment |
When the amount of work is excessive, work that requires time or trouble is easy to be omitted. Therefore, it is important to make sure that work procedures are not omitted by attendance of a manager or a superintendent at the workplace. Full explanations of the reasons for the work need to be given.
A fusible plug is attached in the upper part of a cylinder. If heated, the fusible plug melts and gas inside escapes. However, when heated rapidly, a cylinder ruptures and damage can spread. |
| Background |
The cause of the accident is supposed to be defective safety education. As it is not such a big company, the managers of the factory might have known the actual work conditions. It is assumed that insufficient safety education was not the most important factor. It is assumed that the factory managers gave greater importance to efficiency rather than safety due to a lack of hazard consciousness. |
| Incidental Discussion |
Generally, when a liquid leaks, the combustible gas-air mixture with a volume of 10,000 times greater than the leaked liquid is formed. If it burns, its volume will increase as six times as much. Therefore, safety education that is closely related to the work is important. |
| Reason for Adding to DB |
Example of explosion and fire caused due to disregarding of working safety |
| Scenario |
| Primary Scenario
|
Organizational Problems, Inflexible Management Structure, Insufficient Education/Training, Poor Value Perception, Poor Safety Awareness, Inadequate Risk Recognition, Ignorance, Insufficient Knowledge, No Knowledge that LPG is Dangerous, Malicious Act, Rule Violation, Safety Rule Violation, Secondary Damage, External Damage, Explosion/Fire, Bodily Harm, Death, 2 person died, Bodily Harm, Injury, 6 person injured, Loss to Organization, Economic Loss, LPG filling station and others burnt, Damage to Society, Social Systems Failure, Infrastructure of the local area
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| Sources |
The promotion committee of the Hokkaido headquarters of industrial disaster measures, The LP gas accident investigation subcommittee in Asahikawa-shi, LP gas factory. (Container inspection place). The report of accident investigation subcommittee, 1989.
Asahikawa fire-fighting headquarters, The outline of H propane factory fire. (1989).
High Pressure Gas Safety Inst. of Japan. High-pressure gas protection overview. pp.129, 142-143 (1989).
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| Number of Deaths |
2 |
| Number of Injuries |
3 |
| Physical Damage |
A fire destroyed a LPG filling station including the container store, filling room, paint room, etc. An adjoining building partially burned. A LPG loading truck, a tank lorry, and a passenger car were damaged by a fire. Cylinder debris was scattered within a distance of 15-100 m. Propane cylinders ruptured. |
| Consequences |
Evacuation of residents was considered. A power failure affected neighborhood residences. Interruption of a Japan Rail services. Telephone failures. |
| Field |
Chemicals and Plants
|
| Author |
ITAGAKI, Haruhiko (Japan National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health)
TAMURA, Masamitsu (Center for Risk Management and Safety Sciences, Yokohama National University)
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