| Case Name |
Fire caused due to a drop of structure into a corroded kerosene tank |
| Pictograph |
|
| Date |
February 16, 1975 |
| Place |
Yokkaichi, Mie, Japan |
| Location |
Refinery |
| Overview |
A kerosene tank at the refinery exploded. By changing a distillate to the tank, a more corrosive substance than before was contained. As this was overlooked, corrosion progressed. Therefore, the tank collapsed due to rapid temperature lowering and effects of strong winds. The fire occurred by the shock of the collapsing tank. Although it was a full-surface tank fire, it took only about four hours to extinguish. |
| Incident |
A full-surface tank fire occurred at a 22000 kL kerosene tank in a refinery. Straight run kerosene from an atmospheric distillation unit flowed into the tank via an odor water treatment unit. At the time of the accident, the tank was operated as usual.
Odor water treatment unit; an in-house development unit. By mixing odorous waste water and straight run kerosene, odor components such as hydrogen sulfide are extracted and transferred to the kerosene. Naturally corrosive substances such as hydrogen sulfide are contained in the kerosene from odor water treatment equipment. |
| Processing |
Storage |
| Process Flow |
Fig2.Unit process flow
|
| Substance |
Hydrogen sulfide, Fig3 |
| Kerosene |
| Mercaptan |
| Type of Accident |
Fire |
| Sequence |
In March, 1963, the tank began to be used as a fuel oil storage tank.
In August, 1967, cleaning and inspection of the inside of the tank was carried out.
In June, 1972, stored oil was changed to kerosene. At the time, some of the kerosene was run down via the odor water treatment unit.
15:03 on February 16th, 1975, a fire occurred.
19:40, the fire was extinguished. |
| Cause |
Some part of kerosene was being received from the oil water separator of the odor water treatment unit after the kerosene had been used for extracting odor components such as hydrogen sulfide in odor waste water. The corrosiveness of the kerosene was much stronger than that of normal kerosene. It corroded the tank over long-term use. The tank became weak and its inside structure collapsed. The impact of the falling structure ignited the kerosene. On the day of the accident, the temperature suddenly fell, so the roof contracted. By the effect of the contraction of the roof and window pressure, the tank inside structure seemed to have collapsed. |
| Response |
The air foam chambers of the tank worked, but it is not clear that the air foam chamber worked well or not after the tank collapsed. The private fire brigade sent four chemical fire engines, and supplied foam extinguishing liquid and sprayed cooling water on the tank and nearby tanks. After public fire fighters arrived, the private brigade was put under its supervision. Fire extinguishing activities were carried out by the public fire brigade. |
| Countermeasures |
1. Odor water treatment equipment was abolished.
2. A nitrogen blanket was installed in the semi-finished kerosene tank.
3. Extinguishing facilities were strengthened.
4. A TV monitor was installed in a concentric stack, and the 24-hour monitoring system was set up. An overhaul inspection of the tank will be important to prevent recurrence. |
| Knowledge Comment |
The persons related to the tank did not understand that a tank could be easily corroded by semi-finished kerosene including hydrogen sulfide. From this fact, it was well known that an overhaul inspection of such a tank is important, and the law was revised. The importance of the fire fighting facilities was discussed, and a new regulation for hazard prevention in a petroleum complex was drafted. |
| Background |
It was overlooked that contents of the tank contained corrosive substances, and that the corrosion rapidly advanced to the structure of the tank. However, the accident was caused due to safety management, and the reason why it was overlooked is not clear. |
| Sequel |
This large-scale complex disaster, which followed the M petroleum M refinery disaster, provided an opportunity to revise the petroleum complex law. A three-point set consisted of a high fire extinguishing engine, a chemical fire fighting engine, and a foam storage track for fire fighting in a petroleum complex became obligatory. |
| Incidental Discussion |
The importance of follow-up after starting operation of in-house developed equipment is shown. The developer should pay attention not only to his own development tasks, but also follow up influences on related facilities. |
| Reason for Adding to DB |
Example of large-scale fire of an oil tank due to overlooking corrosive properties of distillate |
| Scenario |
| Primary Scenario
|
Poor Value Perception, Poor Safety Awareness, Insufficient Recognition of Risk, Insufficient Analysis or Research, Insufficient Practice, Lack of Imagination, Organizational Problems, Poor Management, Slackness of Management, Planning and Design, Poor Planning, Poor Process Design, Usage, Maintenance/Repair, No Inspection, Failure, Abrasion, Corrosion, Failure, Large-Scale Damage, Internal Structure Falled down, Secondary Damage, External Damage, Fire, Loss to Organization, Economic Loss, Monetary Damage 300 million yen
|
|
| Sources |
Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Examples of accidents at dangerous material manufacturers, pp.132-133 (1975)
National Research Inst. of Fire and Disaster. Report of Fire Res. Inst. No.7. D oil tank fire leads to research report in Y City. (1975)
Tetsuzo Kitagawa. Explosion at kerosene tank, Analysis of explosion hazard. pp.36-38(1980)
Fire Department of Yokkaichi City, Aftermath of petroleum complex disaster. Modern fire fighting No.264, pp.44-49(1984)
|
| Physical Damage |
A 22,000 kL tank was completely destroyed by fire. |
| Financial Cost |
¥ 36 million (Fire and Disaster Management Agency) |
| Consequences |
South Fire Station of Yokkaichi City ordered 1300 residents near the refinery to prepare for evacuation. |
| Multimedia Files |
Fig3.Chemical formula
|
| Field |
Chemicals and Plants
|
| Author |
KOSEKI, Hirosi (National Research Institute of Fire and Disaster)
TAMURA, Masamitsu (Center for Risk Management and Safety Sciences, Yokohama National University)
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