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Case Ditails

Case Name Explosion of organic peroxide caused from a warehouse fire
Pictograph
Date July 14, 1964
Place Shinagawa, Tokyo, Japan
Location Warehouse
Overview A large explosion occurred in a warehouse that stored combustibles and explosives near the Tokyo Metropolitan Expressway (Haneda-Yokohama line). Nitrocellulose in drum cans, which were stacked outdoors in the warehouse district, ignited spontaneously, and there was a fire. It spread to other containers of nitrocellulose, acetones, and alcohols outdoors and in warehouses. Methyl ethyl ketone peroxide stored in a warehouse exploded during fire extinguishing activities. Two warehouses collapsed, and a total of 19 firemen died. In addition, a large number of fire fighters, policemen, and journalists received serious or slight injuries. The cause of the fire was spontaneous ignition of nitrocellulose. As wet nitrocellulose in drum cans was left outside exposed to direct sunshine, it is presumed that it got partially dried and ignited spontaneously. As a lot of inflammable substances were stored near the fire, the fire spread. Many casualties were caused in the secondary disaster. The basic cause is inadequate recognition of the company staff about the hazardous materials.
Incident There was a large explosion in a hazardous materials warehouse which stored combustibles and explosives near the Tokyo Metropolitan Expressway (Haneda-Yokohama line). Nitrocellulose in drum cans stacked in the warehouse district ignited spontaneously, and there was a fire. The fire spread to stacks of other containers of nitrocellulose, acetones, and alcohol, and warehouses in the district. Methyl ethyl ketone peroxide stored in the warehouse ignited and exploded during fire fighting. A two-story warehouse collapsed due to the explosion, and a total of 19 firemen died. In addition, a large number of firemen, policemen, and journalists received serious or slight injuries.
Processing Storage
Substance Methyl ethyl ketone peroxide, Fig2
Nitrocellulose
Type of Accident Fire, explosion
Sequence About 21:55 on July 14th, 1964, nitrocellulose in drums stacked on vacant ground in a warehouse district ignited spontaneously, and a fire occurred. The fire spread to stacks of containers of inflammable liquids such as nitrocellulose, acetones, and alcohol. Few employees who lived in nearby company houses and other persons tried initial fire extinguishing using a hand pump. However, that was insufficient.
Public fire fighters turned out and carried out fire extinguishing activities. However, the fire spread to a warehouse, and oil cans and containers of lacquer etc. exploded and burned. Therefore, fire fighting was difficult, and the fire did not go out. When the fire began to die down at about 22:56, a large explosion occurred. About 2200 kg of methyl ethyl ketone peroxide stored in the warehouse exploded, and the warehouse and two adjacent warehouses were destroyed.
As a result, eighteen firemen and one voluntary fireman in the vicinity were crushed to death under the debris. Other fire fighters were also injured by debris and sparks. Subsequently, fire fighting and rescue activities for the injured were carried out.
The fire was extinguished at 1:38 on July 15th, which was the next day.
Cause The cause of the first fire was spontaneous ignition of nitrocellulose. To prevent spontaneous ignition, nitrocellulose is kept wet with alcohol. However, it is presumed that the nitrocellulose ignited spontaneously as it dried partially, because it was left outdoors exposed to direct sunshine. As large amounts of inflammable substances were stored near the fire, the fire spread. Since a lot of organic peroxide with explosion risk was stored, many casualties were caused in the secondary disaster.
Countermeasures Strengthened legal regulation of hazardous materials. Administrative control was strengthened. Chemical fire fighting techniques were improved.
Knowledge Comment During fire fighting activities where there is a possibility of existence of hazardous chemicals, it is necessary to consider thorough measures to prevent a secondary disaster.
Background The manager and the employees of the warehouse company underestimated the hazardous materials. The careless storage of hazardous materials was usually done. For example, the quantity of stored hazardous materials exceeded regulations without permission.
The hazards of the stored materials were not informed the fire station.
Sequel After this accident, fire fighting related laws and regulations were revised. The following were incorporated: Strengthening administrative control and strengthening information collection.
Reason for Adding to DB Example of secondary disaster during fire extinguishing activities
Scenario
Primary Scenario Poor Value Perception, Poor Safety Awareness, Inadequate Risk Recognition, Organizational Problems, Poor Management, Slackness of Management, Insufficient Analysis or Research, Insufficient Practice, No Study of Extinguishment at Occurring Acciddent, Planning and Design, Poor Planning, Excess Storage Quantity, Usage, Transport/Storage, Selection mistake of Storage Place, Bad Event, Chemical Phenomenon, Spontaneous Ignition, Secondary Damage, External Damage, Explosion/Fire, Bodily Harm, Death, 19 person died, Bodily Harm, Injury, Many person injured including reporters, Loss to Organization, Economic Loss, Direct damage 5500 million yen
Sources Tetsuzo Kitagawa. Nitrocellulose and explosion at organic peroxide warehouse. Analysis of the explosion hazard, pp.195-210(1980),
Tokyo Fire Dep., Fire fighting science laboratory second laboratory, The burning behavior of methyl ethyl ketone. Monthly fire-fighting, No.40, pp.57-64(1981).
Number of Deaths 19
Number of Injuries 114
Physical Damage 10 buildings (total 7364 square metes) were lost by fire. Small fires in three warehouses.
Financial Cost ¥ 55 hundred million. (Buildings ¥ 1 billion, accommodation ¥ 45 hundred million). (By Tokyo Fire Dep.).
Multimedia Files Fig2.Chemical formula
Notes An explosion of methyl ethyl ketone peroxide of the organic peroxide stored at a site might be caused by the ignition of nitrocellulose. At the maximum two tons of dimethyl phthalate used as a dilute solution might have dispersed into the environment due to the explosion. An environmental hormone action has been confirmed in related chemical compounds. At present, it is being monitored as a "related material," and has been detected indoors at comparatively high density.
Field Chemicals and Plants
Author OGAWA, Terushige (Graduate School of Environment and Information Sciences, Yokohama National University)
YOSHINAGA, Jun (Graduate School of New Frontier Sciences, The University of Tokyo)
TAMURA, Masamitsu (Center for Risk Management and Safety Sciences, Yokohama National University)