| Case Name |
Large explosion at a fireworks factory |
| Pictograph |
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| Date |
April 11, 2003 |
| Place |
Kagoshima, Kagoshima, Japan |
| Location |
Firework factory |
| Overview |
An explosion occurred at a fireworks factory. Large amounts of illegally stored explosives aggravated the accident, and major damage was also caused to nearby residents. Determination of the cause has not been done, because those concerned were killed, and because the first explosion site was almost totally destroyed. |
| Incident |
An explosion occurred at a fireworks factory. Due to a large amount of explosives stored, the damage expanded. The damage spread outside the factory and two persons inside and four outside were injured. There was extensive material damage around the factory. Although the location of the factory was a mountainous region 5 km from an urban district, damage outside the factory increased because there were an adjoining distribution base and high school. |
| Processing |
Manufacture |
| Individual Process |
Other |
| Substance |
Potassium perchlorate, Fig2 |
| Sulfur, Fig3 |
| Explosive |
| Chlorate |
| Nitrate |
| Type of Accident |
Explosion, fire |
| Sequence |
13:27, on April 11th, 2003, an explosion occurred.
13:30, the public fire brigade was called out.
13:40, the public fire brigade arrived at the site.
13:56, extinguishing was confirmed. |
| Cause |
The cause of the accident is uncertain. In many explosions of explosives, as all the persons near the accident place might have died, the site might be destroyed completely, and the documents might be lost totally, so identifying the cause is difficult. From the situation of the site, there is a big possibility that the first explosion was at the blending site where explosives were filled into fireworks, ignition explosives were mixed, and a detonator was combined, and they might have been ignited by an impact, friction, or static electricity. The cause of the accident spreading was considered to be a violation of laws and ordinances. There were large amounts of explosives in the raw materials stocker, which is not permitted to store explosives. The amount of explosives greatly exceeded the quantity permitted at a blending site, a temporary storage site for explosives, etc. |
| Response |
A total of 15 fire engines and three ambulances of the public fire brigade turned out. |
| Countermeasures |
According to a report of the coordination and prevention of recurrence committee of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Nuclear Safety and Protection Agency, announced three months after the accident, the following facts are mentioned.
1. Improvement of a compliance system.
2. Better management supervision by the prefecture.
3. Better management supervision by the administrative organs.
The following recommendations to nation were made. Reexamination of technical standards, introduction of a training system for management supervisors of administrative divisions, improvement of an on-the-spot inspection and safety inspection manual, guidance by specialists for fireworks manufacturers. |
| Knowledge Comment |
The size of a explosion is determined from the quantity stored and countermeasures for explosion. It is important to decrease the influence of an accident because it is very difficult to completely eliminate the triggers of an accident, even if they can be reduced. |
| Background |
The cause of the first explosion is uncertain. Over-familiarity with the work and an error are considered. Maintenance of facilities and education and training might be related.
The cause of aggravation must be a violation of laws and ordinances. |
| Incidental Discussion |
Features of many accidents related to explosives are that the specific cause is not determined, and that the damage increases if the quantity stored exceeds that allowed by laws. |
| Reason for Adding to DB |
Example of explosion expanded due to illegal mass storage of explosives |
| Scenario |
| Primary Scenario
|
Poor Value Perception, Poor Organizational Culture, Laws and Regulations Violation all over the Company, Poor Value Perception, Poor Safety Awareness, Inadequate Risk Recognition, Misjudgment, Narrow Outlook, Habit, Usage, Transport/Storage, Too Much Storage, Bad Event, Chemical Phenomenon, Heat Generation/Ignition, Secondary Damage, External Damage, Explosion/Fire, Bodily Harm, Death, 10 person died, Bodily Harm, Injury, 4 person injured, Loss to Organization, Economic Loss, Loss to Organization, Social Loss, Trust Damage, Damage to Society, Social Systems Failure
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| Sources |
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Nuclear Safety and Protection Agency. Press announcement. Preventing recurrence of smoke fire accidents. Smoke fire accident prevention report of recurrence committee settlement of Kagoshima Prefecture. (Outline). Nuclear safety and Protection Agency home page. (2003)
Fire Fighting Station of Kagoshima City. Outline of firework manufacturer fire and explosion. Modern Fire Fighting. No.508. pp.62-67 (2003)
Fire Fighting Station of Kagoshima City. Outline of fire and explosion at fireworks manufacturer. Monthly Fire Fighting, No.288. pp.20-26 (2003)
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| Number of Deaths |
10 |
| Number of Injuries |
4 |
| Physical Damage |
Inside the factory: 31 buildings (complete collapse of eight buildings, partial collapse of one building, damage to 22 buildings) and 24 cars.
Outside the factory; 60 housing units and buildings (total loss by fire of one building and partial damage to 98 buildings), 18 cars. Damage ranged over a radius of about 850 m from the accident site. (Fire Fighting Station of Kagoshima City, May 31st) |
| Consequences |
Concrete debris was scattered on an expressway and temporary speed control was carried out. |
| Multimedia Files |
Fig2.Chemical formula
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Fig3.Chemical formula
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Fig4.Field (Asahi Shimbun)
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| Field |
Chemicals and Plants
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| Author |
KOBAYASHI, Mitsuo (Office K)
TAMURA, Masamitsu (Center for Risk Management and Safety Sciences, Yokohama National University)
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