| Case Name |
Explosion and fire of a gas holder at an iron factory |
| Pictograph |
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| Date |
September 3, 2003 |
| Place |
Tokai, Aichi, Japan |
| Location |
Ironworks |
| Overview |
An explosion and a fire occurred at a dry-type coke oven gas (COG) holder under temporary use at an iron works. In addition, nine days after the first explosion, rubber at the lid ignited during cutting work at the wall of a different COG holder, which was damaged by the preceding explosion. In addition, grease at the seal ignited, and there was a fire. There is no description of the cause and the countermeasures. |
| Incident |
When a dry-type 100,000 m3 coke oven gas (COG) holder was repaired at an ironworks, another dry-type 40,000 m3 holder was used. The 40,000 m3 holder exploded. Grease, which was a lubricant of pistons in the holder, ignited and burned. This explosion resulted in the following damage: the 100,000 m3 COG holder, 100,000 m3 blast furnace gas (BFG) holder, and factory buildings were damaged. 15 persons were injured in the blast. In addition, nine days later a fire occurred during hot work to cut off a side plate of the 100,000 m3 COG holder, which was under inspection. |
| Processing |
Storage |
| Substance |
Cokes-oven gas |
| Lubricating oil |
| Type of Accident |
Explosion |
| Sequence |
From August 30th to September 11th, 2003, a 100,000 m3 COG holder was scheduled to be inspected and repaired. A 40,000 m3 holder was substituted.
About 19:42 on September 3rd, the 40,000 m3 COG holder exploded and was destroyed by fire.
03:26 on September 4th, the fire was extinguished.
About 10:50 on September 12th, a fire occurred at the 100,000 m3 COG holder.
12:40, the fire was extinguished. |
| Cause |
Disaster Management Agency stated in its home page dated 09:15 on September 4th that the first explosion and fire occurred due to a reaction of carbon monoxide with oxygen in the holder. The second fire was caused by ignition of a rubber seal of the tank on cutting the side plate, and the fire spread when grease ignited. |
| Response |
The public fire brigade turned out. The private fire brigade sprayed water for cooling. |
| Countermeasures |
There is no description of countermeasures in the report. It is thought that at the second accident, the owner did not accurately grasp the structure and the situation of construction, and left precautions for hot work to the subcontractor. |
| Knowledge Comment |
What caused the second fire? It is necessary to pay attention so that a failure should not be repeated by concentrating attention only on the first accident. |
| Background |
It is impossible to presume the cause of the first explosion because there is insufficient reference material. The probable cause of the first fire is that the client did not caution the subcontractor about rubber and grease, which are combustible, or the client might believed that the tank and its structural attachments would not catch fire. There might have been a lack of safety consciousness. |
| Reason for Adding to DB |
One example of explosion and fire accident occurred continuously in 2003 |
| Scenario |
| Primary Scenario
|
Poor Value Perception, Poor Safety Awareness, Inadequate Risk Recognition, Carelessness, Insufficient Precaution, Planner Carelessness, Usage, Transport/Storage, Storage, Non-Regular Action, Change, Change of Tank in Operation, Secondary Damage, External Damage, Fire, Bodily Harm, Injury, 15 person injured, Loss to Organization, Economic Loss, Manetary Damage only for Restoration 1500 million yen, Damage to Society, Social Systems Failure, Supply and Demand Balance of the Industrial World, Damage to Society, Change in Perception, Discredit to the Coorporation and Administration
|
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| Sources |
Accident prevention technical center, Urgent report, Outline of factory fires that have occurred frequently. Safety & Tomorrow. No.92. pp.17-27 (2003)
Major fire that occurred in August September 2003, Fire. No.266, pp.5-7 (2003).
N Co. N ironworks fire. Fire and Disaster Management Agency home page. (2003)
|
| Number of Injuries |
15 |
| Physical Damage |
At the factory: The roof of a coke oven gas (COG) holder was damaged completely. 1/3 of the roof of a blast furnace gas (BFG) holder was damaged. The COG holder was partial damaged. 1000 factory building windows were broken.
Outside the factory: Window damage and door deformation at 38 housing units (within 3 km). Window glass damage at 8 housing units. (beyond 3 km) (by 17:00 September 9th present, Fire and Disaster Management Agency) |
| Financial Cost |
On September 5th, 2003, N Co. N iron works announced ¥ 1,500 million investment required for reconstruction of three gas holders instead of damaged holders. |
| Consequences |
20:35. as there was a possibility of a diffusion and a secondary explosion of toxic gas, about 600 employees of the mill were evacuated by Aichi Prefecture Police and Tokai police station. They were not allowed to enter within a 1 km radius of the tank. |
| Multimedia Files |
Fig2.Tank construction plan
|
| Field |
Chemicals and Plants
|
| Author |
KOBAYASHI, Mitsuo (Office K)
TAMURA, Masamitsu (Center for Risk Management and Safety Sciences, Yokohama National University)
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